Opinion: We Are All Sri Lankans. But Who Holds Power?

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake along with Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka Santosh Jha, and Minister of Health and Mass Media Dr. Nalinda Jayatissa, were jointly greeted by officials at the ceremony of laying foundation stones on September 16 for the construction of an Accident and Emergency Unit at the District General Hospital in Mannar 

By Ainkaran Kugadasan

“The distinction between majority and minority no longer exists. We are all Sri Lankans.”

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake said this during his visit to Mannar in April 2025. He also said that his government’s goal is to create a common Sri Lankan identity that encompasses all people. There is no reason for Tamils to reject this ideal. Citizenship without ethnicity is a core principle of democracy. But for many Tamils, the question is who defines that identity and what place Tamils have in shaping the country. Does it mean equal treatment, recognition of Tamil identity and historical experiences, or meaningful participation and power over land, language, governance and security?

In the November 2024 parliamentary elections, the National People’s Power Party won 159 of the 225 seats, forming a two-thirds majority. In the Jaffna district, it secured three of the six seats with 24.85 percent of the vote. This support for the southern-based National People’s Power Party is politically significant in Jaffna, which has long been the centre of Tamil national politics. The National People’s Power Party’s election manifesto promised a new constitution, power sharing, provincial and local government elections, land and settlement measures, language rights, the release of political prisoners, investigation and accountability, the repeal of repressive laws including the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the establishment of a National Commission on Land and Settlements. After two years, the question is not whether the NPP has identified Tamil concerns, but whether its approach of equal citizenship adequately responds to Tamil political demands, including recognition and political power.

From administrative change to political power

The reopening of the Palali-Achuveli road under the National People’s Power government and the release of some land held by the security forces are encouraging developments. But Tamil political aspirations go beyond how many acres have been returned. The central political question is who makes decisions about land and what influence the Tamil people have over them. Decisions by the military and central government agencies such as the Department of Archaeology, Forest Conservation and Wildlife affect land, livelihoods, places of worship and cultural practices across the North and East. Land return matters, but a long-term solution requires sustained participation and influence by those affected.

Gazette No. 2430/25, published on March 28, 2025, created a dispute over 5,941 acres in the Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Mannar districts. The Gazette stated that unclaimed lands after the specified period would become state lands. Following a Fundamental Rights petition filed by former Member of Parliament M.A. Sumanthiran, the Supreme Court issued an interim order on June 27, 2025, suspending its operation. The Thaiyiddi Viharai and Mayilathamadu-Madhavana disputes raise the same issue. Administrative relief is one thing; consolidated political power is another.

The National People’s Power Party promised to hold provincial council and local government elections within a year of coming to power. Local government elections cannot substitute for provincial councils. More than a decade after the last elections, all provincial councils continue to function under governors without elected representatives. This is not simply an administrative delay; it reflects the breakdown of the constitutional mechanism for power sharing.

The mixed electoral system introduced in 2017 created a legal impediment because delimitation has not been completed. Alternatives have been proposed. The 2022 Parliamentary Select Committee recommended a law allowing elections under the previous proportional system until the legal and delimitation work for the new system is completed. In June 2025, Tamil Arasu Party MP Chanakyan Rajamanickam also presented a private member’s bill aimed at resolving the legal impediment. A Parliamentary Select Committee was appointed in 2026 to examine the system, while the Election Commission says it is ready to conduct elections once the necessary legal arrangements are made.

Provincial Councils are not a complete solution to Tamil political problems, and their powers are limited. But they remain the main mechanism for regional power sharing under the current Constitution. If the National People’s Power considers them inadequate, an alternative model can be presented. But keeping elections dormant is no substitute for devolution. The government describes Praja Shakthi as a community-based national plan for poverty alleviation. But questions have been raised about its relationship with elected local bodies. Former MP M.A. Sumanthiran and the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) have warned that it could become a party-based mechanism operating parallel to local government, raising concerns about constitutional rule, administrative independence and devolution.

Freedom of political expression raises a similar concern. The National People’s Power’s election manifesto promised to repeal repressive laws, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and to amend the Security Act. A notable example is the arrest of Tamil singer Ganeshkumar Sangeethsan from Jaffna in June 2026. The police arrested him under the Prevention of Terrorism Act for posting a video supporting or praising the LTTE. On the Attorney General’s advice, the PTA charge was dropped and a case registered under Section 120 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He was subsequently released on bail. This incident raises the question of whether the application of the law is determined by institutionalised procedures or is subject to political decisions.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) is about to be replaced by the Protecting the State from Terrorism Bill, which was gazetted on 23 September 2026. The Bill provides extensive powers over terrorism-related offences, investigation, arrest and detention, alongside safeguards concerning protest, dissent, media, academic research and civil society. Therefore, it is not yet clear how the promise to abolish the PTA will be fulfilled in practice. The same problem persists with language. The Constitution recognises Sinhala and Tamil as official and national languages, but recognition alone does not guarantee implementation. Difficulties remain in accessing services, documents and information in Tamil in government offices. The fact that instructions and warnings to the public were not adequately provided in Tamil during Cyclone Ditwah points to a gap in the implementation of the official-language policy.

After a year and a half of silence on a new Constitution, the NPP government stated last June that, although it was a key election promise, drafting was not an immediate priority. Against its manifesto, concrete institutional changes remain limited in power-sharing, PC elections, land issues, official-language- policy implementation, Tamil staffing, the release of political prisoners and repeal of the PTA.

There is a mixed picture on accountability. While investigative processes have improved in some cases, including that of 11 youths allegedly abducted by the Navy Intelligence Unit, widespread accountability gaps remain over past violations, including enforced disappearances. This has been highlighted by the UN Human Rights Council. Cases such as the murder of Lasantha Wickrematunge and the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda also remain part of this wider accountability issue. The Chemmani mass grave is once again of importance in this context. Human Rights Watch reported that more than 580 skeletal remains had been recovered from Chemmani by mid-August 2026. Who were they? How did they die? Who is responsible? Will the government provide credible answers to the affected families?

The political demands of the Tamil people did not arise from administrative incompetence. They arose from long-standing conflicts over identity, language, land, state authority, security and power sharing. Therefore, a government’s response to Tamil political problems cannot be judged solely by administrative capacity. A government can improve the way the state is administered while leaving the distribution of political power largely unchanged. This distinction matters after two years: the state can be administered differently, but has the government taken meaningful institutional steps to share political power differently with other ethnic groups? Two years is enough time to assess how far a government with a two-thirds majority has translated its promises into institutional change.

Is equal citizenship enough?

Equality, recognition and political power are interrelated. But they are not interchangeable. Equal citizenship means equal status and rights before the law; recognition means that the Tamil language, Tamil identity and the historical experiences of the Tamil people are accepted as legitimate parts of Sri Lanka’s political life. Political power means that people can exercise meaningful influence over decisions that affect land, administration, language, security and the future.

The National People’s Power has consistently emphasised a common identity as Sri Lankan. But a common national identity cannot require other communities to fit into an identity defined by one community. That common identity can only be meaningful to all when the diversity of Sri Lanka is reflected in the institutions of the country and in the way power is organised. This does not mean that Tamils should reject a shared Sri Lankan identity. Tamil identity and Sri Lankan identity need not be contradictory. But if “we are all Sri Lankans” is to be meaningful, there must be a genuine place within that identity for the language, history, culture, collective memories and political aspirations of Tamils.

That identity must be reflected not only in equal treatment, but also in how political power is organised. Two years later, the central question remains: Is there any sign that the promise of equal citizenship is becoming a project of genuine power sharing?

The writer is a civil society activist based in Jaffna.